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Signing a Bitcoin Transaction with Lamport Signatures (no changes needed)

Signing a Bitcoin Transaction with Lamport Signatures (no changes needed)

Original Postby Antoine Riard

Posted on: May 11, 2024 02:53 UTC

The email from Antoine to Ethan delves into the intricacies of cryptographic techniques and their implications on transaction security and flexibility within blockchain technologies, touching on various methods including Lamport signatures, ECDSA/Schnorr signatures, and potential vulnerabilities and innovations in these areas.

Antoine begins by explaining the mechanics of Lamport signatures in the context of cryptocurrency transactions. In this system, the public key is embedded within the coin itself, necessitating the revelation of the corresponding secret key upon spending the coin. This method ensures that the secret key cannot be reused for future transactions, as it must be included in the blockchain to validate the current transaction.

The conversation then shifts to pre-signed Bitcoin transactions under ECDSA/Schnorr signatures, highlighting the ability of a signer group to modify the transaction hash post-signature—such as adjusting the transaction's destination or fee rate—through off-chain interactions. However, Antoine points out a potential vulnerability where an attacker might guess a short r-value in the ECDSA signature process, thus influencing the transaction hash. Despite this, he reasons that successfully executing such an attack would be highly improbable due to the vast computational effort required to find suitable inputs that would cause an (r, s) pair to verify as a point at infinity.

Antoine further muses about the feasibility of creating a tree of Lamport public keys to achieve a more robust Lamport signature scheme that maintains a one-to-one mapping between transaction bits and Lamport secret key bits. He acknowledges that while theoretically possible, such an approach might encounter practical limitations due to consensus rules within the blockchain network.

Additionally, the email touches upon the potential impact of Grover's algorithm on proof-of-work mining races, suggesting that quantum computing could present challenges to current cryptographic protections against double-spending and other forms of attack.

Lastly, Antoine introduces the concept of a "faux-ctv" variant, which leverages the BIP118 anyprevout feature to create no-input signatures. This technique ensures that any spending transaction is a valid pre-image of the original signature digest, offering another layer of security against unauthorized modifications.

Overall, the email encapsulates a deep dive into the evolving landscape of blockchain security, exploring both existing vulnerabilities and emerging solutions that aim to enhance transaction integrity and flexibility.